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Chris Atwood's avatar

This seems like an reasonable, OK-ish disappointing deal, but I am very skeptical that Trump will be able to get it. And I also disagree with the overall characterization of it as a win-win. Any deal that Russia what it didn't have in February, 2022, is a win for Russia and pretending otherwise is just cope.

Reducing the whole issue to the minimum, Putin based on his latest statements is demanding large chunks of Ukrainian territory (more than he currently has) and that Ukraine be prevented from geopolitically aligning with Europe. (He is also demanding a political purge and demilitarization of Ukraine, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Ukraine wants all its territory back and geopolitical alignment with Europe. (It is also demanding war crimes trials and reparations from Russia, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Given the military stalemate (if it lasts), it would seem that the deal will come down to, one side compromises on Ukraine's geopolitical alignment, and the other compromises on territory, and neither gets the purges. In other words, either Putin gives back some/all already occupied territory and Ukraine is blocked from aligning with Europe, OR, Putin gets to keep all the territory he has and Ukraine is allowed to align with Europe. Your scenario is the first, and it's not entirely unlikely. However, I regard it as rather the less likely of these two non-disastrous scenarios -- a much more likely non-disastrous result would be that Putin keeps all the territory he has on armistice day, and the Ukraine is then free to move towards formal European alignment (including NATO).

And as I said, either one is basically a victory for Russia, since it means Russia successfully used military force to get major politico-military benefits it didn't have in February, 2022. It also proves that absent direct NATO intervention, the Ukraine gov't can't protect its people from Russian annexation. That will be particularly important in any deal that signals Ukraine can't have a European alignment, because it means that Ukraine can't realistically expect to defeat another Russian invasion.

But I think Trump is very unlikely to get even your less likely non-disastrous scenario. Leaving aside the imponderables of character and ability, he's already severely weakened his hand by announcing that he's on a time clock. He's announced that unlike Biden/Harris, he needs a deal quickly and will not be willing to walk away from bad deals and keep fighting if he doesn't get it. That's a classic mistake in negotiating and will probably be the decisive misstep. All Putin has to do is signal that he's willing to fight all the way through Trump's presidency, down to the very last North Korean, and he wins.

My prediction would be that feeling the time pressure, Trump will give Putin both of his basic demands, letting him keep all the territory he actually has in an armistice, and also giving him some kind of guarantee that Ukraine will not be allowed a European alignment. This would be a very disastrous peace, especially since it will make it certain that Ukraine can't expect to ever have the ability to resist Russian military force. This fact, and the expected Ukrainian response to the pressure which Trump will have to put on the gov't to push them into this disastrous treaty will also generate a strong tendency for Ukrainians to completely discount any US assurances whatsoever, leading to the kind of serious doubts about US commitments that Biden encountered after the Afghanistan withdrawal. (In war, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is retreat; in geopolitical diplomacy, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is abandoning an ally.)

That's the fundamentals as I see it.

There are lots of side notes -- you say that US will spend a total of $20 billion on post-war Ukraine, but Vance has already said all post-war payments will have to come from Europe, not the US. Sure, Vance isn't the president, but still, he's a major voice on Ukraine. And you seem to assume that the Biden administration's public statements are a good guide to their actual negotiating stances, which I think is not very reasonable. But these are all hard to predict. In fact, I expect that Putin will try to create realities on the ground between now and Jan. 21 that will both of our scenarios obsolete.

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Francis Turner's avatar

"My strategy is to end the war by having Russia give back half of what it conquered, but keeping Donetsk, Lubyansk, and the Crimea. Plebiscites would be held to confirm that this is the wish of the inhabitants, but mainly for show, since inhabitants who don’t like living in Russia will already have left. A demilitarized zone will be set up on the Russian side, and U.N. troops will patrol it."

I see a couple of issues.

First UN Peacekeepers generally fail at their mission and I would expect them to absolutely fail at this one. My guess is that if such an agreement were made both sides would sneak attacks through the DMZ and both would also likely report atrocities that the peacekeepers failed and some would be fake/exaggerated but hard to prove. Also will the peacekeepers patrol the rest of the RU/UA border to stop incursions like Kharkiv and Kursk? If not then I know exactly how some of the provocations are going to happen. If they are then how many thousands of peacekeepers are you expecting to deploy?

Second I am highly uncertain whether the plebiscites would go the way you (and Putin) would want them to if they are actually fair and honestly administered. They might. But there's also a fair chance that in the Donbas particularly the populace would vote to rejoin Ukraine because the Russian occupation has been so very unpleasant.

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