Some good stuff in here, and the suggestion to write the treaty in English is top-notch lateral thinking. But why no EU membership? And what will you do when Putin won't let go of his "denazification/demilitarization" fetish?
No EU membership is to please the Russians, and Europeans too, since they don't really want to add a giant poor country and would like an easy reason to reject Ukraine. Putin is just politicking when he talks about denazification, and he knows he can't get demilitarization.
I am not convinced that Putin is "just politicking" or knows he can't get demilitarization; so far he has never pulled these asks from his "peace offers". Demilitarization means that Ukraine won't be ready to defend itself next time he takes a bite; denazification means he gets a veto on its next government. Arguably neither of these is a guarantee of victory (Zelensky initially looked a dove when he was voted into office), but provided that he waits for the right moment, these are much better cards than LuganDon and Crimea. (LuganDon might in fact be a negative asset by now, with half the region in ruins and the groundwater poisoned by nuclear waste. If Ukraine gets it back, rebuilding it will probably eat half the GDP...)
As to EU membership, I know it doesn't matter that much (the EU is past its heyday), but I'm afraid that so does Putin.
"My strategy is to end the war by having Russia give back half of what it conquered, but keeping Donetsk, Lubyansk, and the Crimea. Plebiscites would be held to confirm that this is the wish of the inhabitants, but mainly for show, since inhabitants who don’t like living in Russia will already have left. A demilitarized zone will be set up on the Russian side, and U.N. troops will patrol it."
I see a couple of issues.
First UN Peacekeepers generally fail at their mission and I would expect them to absolutely fail at this one. My guess is that if such an agreement were made both sides would sneak attacks through the DMZ and both would also likely report atrocities that the peacekeepers failed and some would be fake/exaggerated but hard to prove. Also will the peacekeepers patrol the rest of the RU/UA border to stop incursions like Kharkiv and Kursk? If not then I know exactly how some of the provocations are going to happen. If they are then how many thousands of peacekeepers are you expecting to deploy?
Second I am highly uncertain whether the plebiscites would go the way you (and Putin) would want them to if they are actually fair and honestly administered. They might. But there's also a fair chance that in the Donbas particularly the populace would vote to rejoin Ukraine because the Russian occupation has been so very unpleasant.
(1) In this case, I don't think either side has much incentive to violate the peace in the small ways the UN is bad at stopping. The main use of the peacekeepers would be to observe and report if there is a big buildup that would show one side is planning an actual invasion, as opposed to raids or harassment.
(2) I was assuming the plebiscites would not be fair and honestly administered. Putin would rig them, and that's fine-- their purpose would be face-saving, not to find out what the populace actually wants.
This seems like an reasonable, OK-ish disappointing deal, but I am very skeptical that Trump will be able to get it. And I also disagree with the overall characterization of it as a win-win. Any deal that Russia what it didn't have in February, 2022, is a win for Russia and pretending otherwise is just cope.
Reducing the whole issue to the minimum, Putin based on his latest statements is demanding large chunks of Ukrainian territory (more than he currently has) and that Ukraine be prevented from geopolitically aligning with Europe. (He is also demanding a political purge and demilitarization of Ukraine, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Ukraine wants all its territory back and geopolitical alignment with Europe. (It is also demanding war crimes trials and reparations from Russia, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Given the military stalemate (if it lasts), it would seem that the deal will come down to, one side compromises on Ukraine's geopolitical alignment, and the other compromises on territory, and neither gets the purges. In other words, either Putin gives back some/all already occupied territory and Ukraine is blocked from aligning with Europe, OR, Putin gets to keep all the territory he has and Ukraine is allowed to align with Europe. Your scenario is the first, and it's not entirely unlikely. However, I regard it as rather the less likely of these two non-disastrous scenarios -- a much more likely non-disastrous result would be that Putin keeps all the territory he has on armistice day, and the Ukraine is then free to move towards formal European alignment (including NATO).
And as I said, either one is basically a victory for Russia, since it means Russia successfully used military force to get major politico-military benefits it didn't have in February, 2022. It also proves that absent direct NATO intervention, the Ukraine gov't can't protect its people from Russian annexation. That will be particularly important in any deal that signals Ukraine can't have a European alignment, because it means that Ukraine can't realistically expect to defeat another Russian invasion.
But I think Trump is very unlikely to get even your less likely non-disastrous scenario. Leaving aside the imponderables of character and ability, he's already severely weakened his hand by announcing that he's on a time clock. He's announced that unlike Biden/Harris, he needs a deal quickly and will not be willing to walk away from bad deals and keep fighting if he doesn't get it. That's a classic mistake in negotiating and will probably be the decisive misstep. All Putin has to do is signal that he's willing to fight all the way through Trump's presidency, down to the very last North Korean, and he wins.
My prediction would be that feeling the time pressure, Trump will give Putin both of his basic demands, letting him keep all the territory he actually has in an armistice, and also giving him some kind of guarantee that Ukraine will not be allowed a European alignment. This would be a very disastrous peace, especially since it will make it certain that Ukraine can't expect to ever have the ability to resist Russian military force. This fact, and the expected Ukrainian response to the pressure which Trump will have to put on the gov't to push them into this disastrous treaty will also generate a strong tendency for Ukrainians to completely discount any US assurances whatsoever, leading to the kind of serious doubts about US commitments that Biden encountered after the Afghanistan withdrawal. (In war, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is retreat; in geopolitical diplomacy, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is abandoning an ally.)
That's the fundamentals as I see it.
There are lots of side notes -- you say that US will spend a total of $20 billion on post-war Ukraine, but Vance has already said all post-war payments will have to come from Europe, not the US. Sure, Vance isn't the president, but still, he's a major voice on Ukraine. And you seem to assume that the Biden administration's public statements are a good guide to their actual negotiating stances, which I think is not very reasonable. But these are all hard to predict. In fact, I expect that Putin will try to create realities on the ground between now and Jan. 21 that will both of our scenarios obsolete.
(1) Yes, this is a victory for Russia, compared to what Russia had in 2020. It is win-win in the sense that in 2024, Russia already has gained a lot of territory and kept Ukraine out of NATO and the EU and made the US and Europe look weak, so any change starts with those basic facts. If Ukraine gains ANY territory back, that's an improvement.
(2) The bad bargain you describe-- an armistice at the current front lines, with Ukraine staying out of NATO and the EU-- is still win-win compared to the status quo, even though it is a bad bargain. It is still better for both sides than no bargain. It keeps the status quo except for ending the war, but both sides gain from ending the war.
(3) Trump really is good at bargaining. Both sides are bluffing. Whatever Vance says can be discounted. Putin's announced desire for more territory can be discounted too.
I agree that territory is the most fundamental thing -- getting back a situation where Ukraine controls land access to Crimea and has access to the Sea of Azov would be a win compared to the present. (Although still a loss overall, if the price is not being allowed to align with Europe.) So, if Trump can get that, then that will be to his credit as negotiator. But if he just gets the bad bargain I described then that's not being a good negotiator, that's just settling, where the current team wasn't willing to settle. I guess we'll see.
I think this is mostly misguided. Putin will not accept such deal, because new regions are already a part of Russia by Russian law, so it would take an extraordinary threat to make him give 2 out of 4 back - a threat Trump probably can't deliver. It being better than continuing war is also questionable: if the frontlines were already hard-frozen (as they seemed in 2023) this might have been an argument for the peace deal, but in 2024 Russia has been advancing steadily (if still slowly by mechanized war standards), and Ukraine's adventures in Kursk region seem to only made situation worse. I would think Putin sees the possibility of breaking AFU completely in a year or two, and then getting a much, much better deal. Even with US and EU aid, Ukraine just don't have manpower enough to outlast Russia.
Also, with this configuration, there is no mechanism to enforce Ukraine's neutrality, which is really the main reason for the war. Sure, it can sign some papers that say it will not join NATO for 10, 20 or even 50 years. It can tear up that same papers the moment Russian tanks leave. Admittedly, how to enforce this in a big question even in case of total Russia victory, e.g. Russian troops on Polish border - short of expensive occupation, it's really hard to make another country follow any sort of agreement it doesn't like at all. And since "total victory" doesn't seem achievable for Russia right now, I'm not sure what Putin's plan for "partial victory" is, but it's probably not "just some easily broken agreements".
You also make an off-hand remark about "poor and obscure" provinces, while in truth Donbas is the industrial powerhouse of Ukraine, where most of its heavy industry and resource extraction is located. Most of it is heavily damaged or destroyed now, but resources remain where they are (coal, primarily, but I think there was talk about much more profitable lithium). While not central to the argument, this shows poor understanding of the situation.
Coal doesn't make a country rich. Indeed, heavy industry doesn't either, nowadays.
You may be right about the possibility of a Russian breakthrough. I haven't been paying much attention to what analysts say, since various of them have been predicting big Ukrainian and big Russian breakthroughs for two years and they're always wrong. One difficulty in understanding this war is that both Ukraine and Russia have a rich legacy of KGB experts in disinformation, and the US government can't be believed on the subject of who's winning either. So I fall back on looking at hte map and seeing that the lines barely budge.
It pays to watch not just the lines, but dynamics: where Ukrainian summer counter-offensive in 2023 barely managed to recapture a few villages, Russian actions in 2024 slowly gained steam, but by now Russian forces capture a few villages a week, and managed to conquer a few strongly defended positions and almost encircle one more. That is NOT to say there going to be a major breakthrough soon - Ukraine still has enough men and ammo and tanks, but so far, dynamics look favourable for Putin.
I can't imagine Russia accepting any deal that makes it give back land (aside maybe from the small part of Kharkov region), or even just freezes battle lines as-is. Internationally controlled DMZ is also out of question (certainly not with British troops, as one leaked plan suggested - Russia will never trust Britain). What can possible Trump offer that Putin MIGHT accept? My own guess: nothing, until Russia offensive gets bogged down again, and not because of weather. After that - a full control of all captured regions, demilitarization of Ukraine (possible with allowance for self-defence forces, once again, like Japan), a set of laws to protect Russia-speaking people there (keep Russian as a second state language, teach it in schools, etc.). This might seem like a total loss for Ukraine, but it's not: Ukraine already has treaties with several countries that should trigger some (admittedly, vague) kind of aid in case of next Russia attack, which just might be enough to deter such attack, and lack of full-scale military might satisfy Russia as a kind of guarantee against Ukraine being a NATO member. And while Ukraine will not be a member of NATO or EU, it can probably make more treaties, both on defence and on trade, that will kind of work in their stead.
A few villages a week isn't very good progress, and there's no sign of anything important being captured. Indeed, I don't know why Russia would care much about most of what it has captured except that the Crimea is valuable and having water supply and land access to it is good. But Russia would like peace, a peace in which Putin can claim victory. Ukraine needs to be able to claim victory too, so Russia needs to give it back some land.
This could work.
Some good stuff in here, and the suggestion to write the treaty in English is top-notch lateral thinking. But why no EU membership? And what will you do when Putin won't let go of his "denazification/demilitarization" fetish?
No EU membership is to please the Russians, and Europeans too, since they don't really want to add a giant poor country and would like an easy reason to reject Ukraine. Putin is just politicking when he talks about denazification, and he knows he can't get demilitarization.
I am not convinced that Putin is "just politicking" or knows he can't get demilitarization; so far he has never pulled these asks from his "peace offers". Demilitarization means that Ukraine won't be ready to defend itself next time he takes a bite; denazification means he gets a veto on its next government. Arguably neither of these is a guarantee of victory (Zelensky initially looked a dove when he was voted into office), but provided that he waits for the right moment, these are much better cards than LuganDon and Crimea. (LuganDon might in fact be a negative asset by now, with half the region in ruins and the groundwater poisoned by nuclear waste. If Ukraine gets it back, rebuilding it will probably eat half the GDP...)
As to EU membership, I know it doesn't matter that much (the EU is past its heyday), but I'm afraid that so does Putin.
"My strategy is to end the war by having Russia give back half of what it conquered, but keeping Donetsk, Lubyansk, and the Crimea. Plebiscites would be held to confirm that this is the wish of the inhabitants, but mainly for show, since inhabitants who don’t like living in Russia will already have left. A demilitarized zone will be set up on the Russian side, and U.N. troops will patrol it."
I see a couple of issues.
First UN Peacekeepers generally fail at their mission and I would expect them to absolutely fail at this one. My guess is that if such an agreement were made both sides would sneak attacks through the DMZ and both would also likely report atrocities that the peacekeepers failed and some would be fake/exaggerated but hard to prove. Also will the peacekeepers patrol the rest of the RU/UA border to stop incursions like Kharkiv and Kursk? If not then I know exactly how some of the provocations are going to happen. If they are then how many thousands of peacekeepers are you expecting to deploy?
Second I am highly uncertain whether the plebiscites would go the way you (and Putin) would want them to if they are actually fair and honestly administered. They might. But there's also a fair chance that in the Donbas particularly the populace would vote to rejoin Ukraine because the Russian occupation has been so very unpleasant.
(1) In this case, I don't think either side has much incentive to violate the peace in the small ways the UN is bad at stopping. The main use of the peacekeepers would be to observe and report if there is a big buildup that would show one side is planning an actual invasion, as opposed to raids or harassment.
(2) I was assuming the plebiscites would not be fair and honestly administered. Putin would rig them, and that's fine-- their purpose would be face-saving, not to find out what the populace actually wants.
This seems like an reasonable, OK-ish disappointing deal, but I am very skeptical that Trump will be able to get it. And I also disagree with the overall characterization of it as a win-win. Any deal that Russia what it didn't have in February, 2022, is a win for Russia and pretending otherwise is just cope.
Reducing the whole issue to the minimum, Putin based on his latest statements is demanding large chunks of Ukrainian territory (more than he currently has) and that Ukraine be prevented from geopolitically aligning with Europe. (He is also demanding a political purge and demilitarization of Ukraine, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Ukraine wants all its territory back and geopolitical alignment with Europe. (It is also demanding war crimes trials and reparations from Russia, but that's almost certainly just a bargaining chip.) Given the military stalemate (if it lasts), it would seem that the deal will come down to, one side compromises on Ukraine's geopolitical alignment, and the other compromises on territory, and neither gets the purges. In other words, either Putin gives back some/all already occupied territory and Ukraine is blocked from aligning with Europe, OR, Putin gets to keep all the territory he has and Ukraine is allowed to align with Europe. Your scenario is the first, and it's not entirely unlikely. However, I regard it as rather the less likely of these two non-disastrous scenarios -- a much more likely non-disastrous result would be that Putin keeps all the territory he has on armistice day, and the Ukraine is then free to move towards formal European alignment (including NATO).
And as I said, either one is basically a victory for Russia, since it means Russia successfully used military force to get major politico-military benefits it didn't have in February, 2022. It also proves that absent direct NATO intervention, the Ukraine gov't can't protect its people from Russian annexation. That will be particularly important in any deal that signals Ukraine can't have a European alignment, because it means that Ukraine can't realistically expect to defeat another Russian invasion.
But I think Trump is very unlikely to get even your less likely non-disastrous scenario. Leaving aside the imponderables of character and ability, he's already severely weakened his hand by announcing that he's on a time clock. He's announced that unlike Biden/Harris, he needs a deal quickly and will not be willing to walk away from bad deals and keep fighting if he doesn't get it. That's a classic mistake in negotiating and will probably be the decisive misstep. All Putin has to do is signal that he's willing to fight all the way through Trump's presidency, down to the very last North Korean, and he wins.
My prediction would be that feeling the time pressure, Trump will give Putin both of his basic demands, letting him keep all the territory he actually has in an armistice, and also giving him some kind of guarantee that Ukraine will not be allowed a European alignment. This would be a very disastrous peace, especially since it will make it certain that Ukraine can't expect to ever have the ability to resist Russian military force. This fact, and the expected Ukrainian response to the pressure which Trump will have to put on the gov't to push them into this disastrous treaty will also generate a strong tendency for Ukrainians to completely discount any US assurances whatsoever, leading to the kind of serious doubts about US commitments that Biden encountered after the Afghanistan withdrawal. (In war, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is retreat; in geopolitical diplomacy, the most difficult maneuver to execute successfully is abandoning an ally.)
That's the fundamentals as I see it.
There are lots of side notes -- you say that US will spend a total of $20 billion on post-war Ukraine, but Vance has already said all post-war payments will have to come from Europe, not the US. Sure, Vance isn't the president, but still, he's a major voice on Ukraine. And you seem to assume that the Biden administration's public statements are a good guide to their actual negotiating stances, which I think is not very reasonable. But these are all hard to predict. In fact, I expect that Putin will try to create realities on the ground between now and Jan. 21 that will both of our scenarios obsolete.
(1) Yes, this is a victory for Russia, compared to what Russia had in 2020. It is win-win in the sense that in 2024, Russia already has gained a lot of territory and kept Ukraine out of NATO and the EU and made the US and Europe look weak, so any change starts with those basic facts. If Ukraine gains ANY territory back, that's an improvement.
(2) The bad bargain you describe-- an armistice at the current front lines, with Ukraine staying out of NATO and the EU-- is still win-win compared to the status quo, even though it is a bad bargain. It is still better for both sides than no bargain. It keeps the status quo except for ending the war, but both sides gain from ending the war.
(3) Trump really is good at bargaining. Both sides are bluffing. Whatever Vance says can be discounted. Putin's announced desire for more territory can be discounted too.
I agree that territory is the most fundamental thing -- getting back a situation where Ukraine controls land access to Crimea and has access to the Sea of Azov would be a win compared to the present. (Although still a loss overall, if the price is not being allowed to align with Europe.) So, if Trump can get that, then that will be to his credit as negotiator. But if he just gets the bad bargain I described then that's not being a good negotiator, that's just settling, where the current team wasn't willing to settle. I guess we'll see.
I think this is mostly misguided. Putin will not accept such deal, because new regions are already a part of Russia by Russian law, so it would take an extraordinary threat to make him give 2 out of 4 back - a threat Trump probably can't deliver. It being better than continuing war is also questionable: if the frontlines were already hard-frozen (as they seemed in 2023) this might have been an argument for the peace deal, but in 2024 Russia has been advancing steadily (if still slowly by mechanized war standards), and Ukraine's adventures in Kursk region seem to only made situation worse. I would think Putin sees the possibility of breaking AFU completely in a year or two, and then getting a much, much better deal. Even with US and EU aid, Ukraine just don't have manpower enough to outlast Russia.
Also, with this configuration, there is no mechanism to enforce Ukraine's neutrality, which is really the main reason for the war. Sure, it can sign some papers that say it will not join NATO for 10, 20 or even 50 years. It can tear up that same papers the moment Russian tanks leave. Admittedly, how to enforce this in a big question even in case of total Russia victory, e.g. Russian troops on Polish border - short of expensive occupation, it's really hard to make another country follow any sort of agreement it doesn't like at all. And since "total victory" doesn't seem achievable for Russia right now, I'm not sure what Putin's plan for "partial victory" is, but it's probably not "just some easily broken agreements".
You also make an off-hand remark about "poor and obscure" provinces, while in truth Donbas is the industrial powerhouse of Ukraine, where most of its heavy industry and resource extraction is located. Most of it is heavily damaged or destroyed now, but resources remain where they are (coal, primarily, but I think there was talk about much more profitable lithium). While not central to the argument, this shows poor understanding of the situation.
Coal doesn't make a country rich. Indeed, heavy industry doesn't either, nowadays.
You may be right about the possibility of a Russian breakthrough. I haven't been paying much attention to what analysts say, since various of them have been predicting big Ukrainian and big Russian breakthroughs for two years and they're always wrong. One difficulty in understanding this war is that both Ukraine and Russia have a rich legacy of KGB experts in disinformation, and the US government can't be believed on the subject of who's winning either. So I fall back on looking at hte map and seeing that the lines barely budge.
It pays to watch not just the lines, but dynamics: where Ukrainian summer counter-offensive in 2023 barely managed to recapture a few villages, Russian actions in 2024 slowly gained steam, but by now Russian forces capture a few villages a week, and managed to conquer a few strongly defended positions and almost encircle one more. That is NOT to say there going to be a major breakthrough soon - Ukraine still has enough men and ammo and tanks, but so far, dynamics look favourable for Putin.
I can't imagine Russia accepting any deal that makes it give back land (aside maybe from the small part of Kharkov region), or even just freezes battle lines as-is. Internationally controlled DMZ is also out of question (certainly not with British troops, as one leaked plan suggested - Russia will never trust Britain). What can possible Trump offer that Putin MIGHT accept? My own guess: nothing, until Russia offensive gets bogged down again, and not because of weather. After that - a full control of all captured regions, demilitarization of Ukraine (possible with allowance for self-defence forces, once again, like Japan), a set of laws to protect Russia-speaking people there (keep Russian as a second state language, teach it in schools, etc.). This might seem like a total loss for Ukraine, but it's not: Ukraine already has treaties with several countries that should trigger some (admittedly, vague) kind of aid in case of next Russia attack, which just might be enough to deter such attack, and lack of full-scale military might satisfy Russia as a kind of guarantee against Ukraine being a NATO member. And while Ukraine will not be a member of NATO or EU, it can probably make more treaties, both on defence and on trade, that will kind of work in their stead.
A few villages a week isn't very good progress, and there's no sign of anything important being captured. Indeed, I don't know why Russia would care much about most of what it has captured except that the Crimea is valuable and having water supply and land access to it is good. But Russia would like peace, a peace in which Putin can claim victory. Ukraine needs to be able to claim victory too, so Russia needs to give it back some land.
REVISIONS:
(1) https://www.brookings.edu/articles/10-maps-that-explain-ukraines-struggle-for-independence/ This is a very good article on Ukraine from Brookings with 10 maps of election results over the years, polls, language, etc.
(2) https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1875568067784384621 A january 4, 2025 X thread on military developments that is good and unbiased.
Ukraines not getting the land bridge to Crimea back. That's pretty silly.
I think their best case is peace in exchange for agreeing to Russian annexations along the current frontline.